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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Edward Herbert Hoid appeals from the district court's order denying his 
Motion To Amend Judgment, in which Hoid requested that the district court give 
him credit against his sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of 
probation. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2002, Hoid pied guilty to issuing an insufficient funds check. (R., p.41.) 
The district court withheld judgment and placed Hoid on probation for three 
years. (R., pp.41-45.) As a condition of probation, Hoid was ordered to serve 
180 days in jail but was given credit against his jail time for 70 days of 
presentence incarceration. (R., p.42.) 
On February 1, 2004, Hoid was arrested on a bench warrant for a 
probation violation. (R., pp.70-71, 159.) Hoid ultimately admitted to having 
violated his probation. (R., pp.80-81.) The district court revoked the withheld 
judgment and imposed a unified sentence of three years with one year fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and reinstated Hoid on probation with the condition that 
he serve an additional 120 days in jail. (R., pp.85-89.) The order revoking the 
withheld judgment stated: "For record purposes only, the defendant is entitled to 
credit for two hundred forty-four (244) days served prior to sentencing. Sentence 
shall commence on April 5, 2004." (R., p.86.) 
On November 18, 2004, Hoid was again arrested on a bench warrant for a 
probation violation. (R., pp.95-96, 159.) After Hoid admitted violating his 
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probation, the district court revoked his probation, executed his sentence and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.110-12.) The order revoking probation and 
retaining jurisdiction stated: "For record purposes only, the defendant is entitled 
to credit for three hundred ninety (390) days served as of December 13, 2004." 
(R., p.111.) 
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended 
the balance of Hoid's sentence and reinstated him on probation. (R., pp.117-
20.) The order of probation stated: "For record purposes, the defendant is 
entitled to credit for five hundred seventy two (572) days served as of June 13, 
2005." (R., p.118.) 
On October 3, 2005, the state filed a motion for probation violation, 
alleging, inter alia, that Hoid had absconded supervision. (R., pp.128-30.) The 
court issued a bench warrant, but Hoid was not arrested on the warrant until April 
2, 2011. (R., pp.133-34, 159.) Hoid subsequently admitted to having violated 
his probation by absconding. (R., pp.143-44.) The district court revoked his 
probation and ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.149-52.) In so doing, the 
court advised Hoid that it would give him only that credit for time served to which 
he was absolutely entitled under Idaho law. (6/20/11 Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, 
L.13.) Ultimately, the court gave Hoid "credit for four hundred twenty-two (422) 
days served as of the 20th day of June, 2011" (R., p.151), reflecting the number 
of days Hoid served before sentencing, during the retained jurisdiction period 
and awaiting disposition on his numerous probation violations (R., p.159). The 
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court did not give Hoid credit for any jail time he served a condition of his 
probation. (R., pp.158-59.) 
On July 19, 2011, Hoid filed a Motion To Amend Judgment, requesting 
that he be given credit against his sentence for the jail time he served as a 
condition of his probation. (R., pp.156-58.) Hoid argued that the court's June 
14, 2005 order placing him on probation "gave [him] 572 days credit for time 
served" and, as such, he was "legally entitled to that credit" and the court did "not 
have jurisdiction to ... change the amount of credit it gave Mr. Hoid several years 
ago." (R., p.157.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing, 
reasoning that Hoid was not legally entitled to credit for the jail time he served as 
a condition of probation, and explaining that the calculation of credit for time 
served in its prior orders was for record keeping purposes only, to enable the 
court "to keep track of the maximum credit for time served which it could give" if 
and when Hoid's prison sentence was executed; it was not a final determination 
of the credit to Hoid would receive upon his commitment to prison. (R., p.158 
(emphasis original).) Because Hoid "never submitted to supervision by the 
Department of Probation & Parole" during his periods of probation, the district 
court determined that Hoid was "neither entitled [to] nor deserving of' credit 
against his prison sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of 
probation. (Id. (emphasis original).) Hoid timely appeals. (R., pp.162-65.) 
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ISSUE 
Hoid states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoid's Motion To 
Amend The Judgment because it had previously included 230 days 
served as a condition of probation, and to take the time away 
results in an increase of Mr. Hoid's sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Hoid failed to show that the district court erred by declining to give him credit 
against his sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of his probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
Hoid Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Declining 
To Give Him Credit Against His Sentence For Jail Time He Served 
As A Condition Of Probation 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Hoid's motion to amend the judgment, in which 
Hoid requested that he be given credit against his sentence for the jail time he 
served as a condition of probation. (R., pp.156-59.) Hoid concedes that he was 
not entitled to such credit under Idaho Code § 18-309. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
8.) He argues, however, that because the district court's April 2004, December 
2004 and June 2005 orders gave him credit for the time he served as a condition 
of probation, "the district court lacked authority to take away the credit because 
that would essentially increase Mr. Hoid's sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) 
Hoid's argument fails. The district court interpreted its April 2004, December 
2004 and June 2005 orders as providing a calculation of credit for time served 
for record keeping purposes only, such that the court was not required to give 
Hoid such credit upon finally revoking his probation and ordering his sentence 
executed in June 2011. Hoid has not even argued, much less demonstrated, 
that the court's interpretation of its own orders is clearly erroneous. Having failed 
to do so, Hoid has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to give him credit for time served that had never previously been granted 
and to which he was not entitled under Idaho law. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of 
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986); Sun Valley Ranches. Inc. v. Prairie 
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 
1993). The interpretation of an ambiguous court order presents a question of 
fact. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293. Where the order is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, the appellate court must accept 
the trial court's interpretation, particularly when the trial court is interpreting its 
own order, unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous. ~ at 107-08, 7 41 
P.2d at 1294-95 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Was Not Required Upon Executing Hoid's Sentence To 
Give Hoid Credit For The Jail Time He Served As A Condition Of 
Probation 
Under Idaho law an inmate is entitled to credit for time served if he is 
incarcerated on that sentence. I.C. § 18-309; Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 
403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d 
1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008). He is not entitled to credit for time served if he is 
not incarcerated but is instead on probation or parole. I.C. § 18-309; I.C. § 19-
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2603 (time spent "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as 
a part of the term of his sentence"); I.C. § 20-209A ("time during which the 
person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of 
the board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall 
not be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced"); 
Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869, 187 P.3d at 1244 (I.C. § 18-309 "notably does not base 
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration"). Nor is he entitled to credit 
against his sentence for time actually spent incarcerated during his probation if 
such incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation. State v. Dana, 137 
Idaho 6, 8, 43 P.3d 765, 767 (2002). 
Upon finally executing Hoid's sentence in June 2011, the court gave Hoid 
credit for 422 days served, reflecting the number of days Hoid spent incarcerated 
before sentencing, during the retained jurisdiction period and awaiting disposition 
on his numerous probation violations. (R., pp.151, 159.) The court did not give 
Hoid credit for any of the jail time he served as a condition of his probation, 
reasoning that Hoid was neither entitled to nor deserving of any credit in addition 
to that expressly provided for by law. (R., pp.158-59.) Hoid claims this was 
error, arguing as he did below that the court was required to give him credit for 
the jail time he served as a condition of probation because the court had 
awarded such credit in its prior orders and "to take away the credit ... essentially 
increase[d] Mr. Hoid's sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Hoid's argument 
fails on its premise; the plain language of the prior orders supports the district 
court's determination that the calculation of credit for time served contained 
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therein was for record keeping purposes only and was not a final determination 
of the credit to which Hoid was entitled upon his commitment to prison. 
"The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general 
apply to the interpretation of court orders." Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 
106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Sun Valley 
Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 
1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, like the interpretation of a contract, the 
interpretation of a court order begins with its plain language. See, ~. Weisel v. 
Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, _, 272 P.3d 491, 500 
(2012) ("Courts look to the language of the contract to determine intent." 
(citations omitted)). "If the language is plain and unambiguous, interpretation is a 
matter of law, and this Court will give the [order] its plain meaning." kL. (citation 
omitted). If, on the other hand, the language of the order is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations, the order is ambiguous and this Court must accept 
the trial court's interpretation of its own order, unless that interpretation is clearly 
erroneous. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 107-08, 741 P.2d at 1294-95 (citing I.R.C.P. 
52(a); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Javernick v. 
Smith, 101 Idaho 104,106,609 P.2d 171, 173 (1980)). 
The district court's April 2004 and December 2004 orders both explicitly 
state that the calculation of credit for time served contained therein was "For 
record purposes only." (R., pp.86, 111.) Likewise, the court's June 2005 order 
that reinstated Hoid on probation following a period of retained jurisdiction states 
that the calculation of credit for time served contained therein was "For record 
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purposes." (R., p.118.) Thus, contrary to Hoid's assertions below and on appeal 
that the court's prior orders actually gave him credit for the jail time he served as 
a condition of probation, the plain language of the orders makes clear that the 
calculation of credit for time served contained therein was for record keeping 
purposes only. 
That the court was only keeping track of the total number of days Hoid 
had spent incarcerated (including as a condition of probation) and not actually 
awarding Haid credit for those days makes sense because none of the orders at 
issue constituted a final order committing Haid to the exclusive custody of the 
Department of Correction. Instead, two of the orders (April 2004 and June 2005) 
reinstated Hoid on probation, and the other (December 2005) was an order 
retaining jurisdiction, leaving open the possibility that Haid would again be placed 
on probation and would not have to serve the entirety of his sentence. If the 
court had intended in its April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders to 
actually award Haid credit for all the time he served before his probation was 
finally revoked and his sentence executed (including the days served as a 
condition of probation), it could easily have done so by using language, such as 
that contained in the court's final commitment order, that "The defendant shall 
receive credit for" the total number of days served in connection with the 
underlying offense. (See R., p.151 (emphasis added).) The court did not do so, 
however, and stated instead that the calculation of credit for time served prior to 
Hoid's final commitment was "For record purposes" (R., p.118) or "For record 
purposes only" (R., pp.86, 111). The plain language of the court's prior orders 
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thus supports the district court's determination that Hoid had never actually been 
awarded any credit for the jail time he served as a condition of probation and, as 
such, the court was not required to give Hoid such credit upon finally revoking his 
probation and ordering his sentence executed. 
Even if the court's April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders are 
subject to conflicting interpretations, the district court's interpretation of those 
orders as having not actually awarded Hoid credit for time served is reasonable. 
The court explained: 
It is within this Court's discretion (in an exercise of its mercy) to 
grant credit for time served in addition to that required by law. This 
Court does more often than not, when it thinks it appropriate, grant 
additional credit for time served beyond that required by law in the 
situation in which a probationer submits to supervision by a 
probation officer and attempts to succeed on probation, but simply 
fails over time to make sufficient progress on probation for lack of 
ability or sufficient effort. When this Court does give additional 
credit for time, such additional credit is included in the final 
commitment order. For orders prior to a final commitment order, in 
addition to its own internal record keeping in the court-file, the 
Court will usually include language (in the order which reinstates a 
defendant on probation) to the effect: "For record purposes only, 
the defendant is entitled to _ days credit for time served as of 
(date)." This Court has used this procedure for many years when 
reinstating a defendant on probation to keep track of the maximum 
credit for time served which it could give If and when it becomes 
appropriate at ~ later date under appropriate circumstances to give 
such additional or maximum credit on the occasion of sending a 
defendant to prison and entering a final commitment order. Such 
has been the intent of the quoted language above; it has not been 
the intent of such language to give credit for time served at a time 
when the sentence has been suspended and before such time as it 
is imposed. 
(R., p.158 (emphasis original).) Even if ambiguous, the language of the court's 
April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders reasonably supports the 
district court's conclusion that the calculation of credit for time served contained 
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in those orders was for record keeping purposes only and was not a final 
determination of the credit to which Hoid was entitled upon his final commitment 
to prison. Haid has not even cited the district court's reasoning, much less 
demonstrated that it is clearly erroneous. This Court must therefore accept the 
district court's interpretation of its own orders as providing a calculation of credit 
for time served for record keeping purposes only, and not as a final 
determination of Hoid's entitlement to such credit upon final execution of his 
sentence. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102 at 107-08, 741 P.2d at 1294-95. 
The district court correctly interpreted its own prior orders in concluding 
that Hoid was not entitled to credit against his sentence for the jail time he 
served as a condition of probation. Hoid has failed to show any basis for 
reversal of the court's order denying his Motion to Amend Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Hoid's Motion To Amend Judgment. 
DATED this 2nd day of October 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of October 2012, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
DIANE M. WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APP ELLA TE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
LAF/pm 
I A. FLEMINJG 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
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